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Of the axioms, dictums, and mantras echoing through the US foreign policy and intelligence debates in the wake of controversy over estimates of Iraqi weapons of mass destruction, none reverberates more than: be wary of mind-set and bias and constantly reexamine assumptions. The fact is, however, that genuine wariness and thorough reexaminations have been rare and attention has tended to focus on the more easily recognizable non-cognitive biases, the "lowhanging fruit," that eclipse much more ingrained cognitive biases and the flawed assumptions they engender. 1 Nowhere is this tendency more clearly evident than in the continuing US debate over China, which has long been conducted as if single-outcome predictions of China's long-term future are possible and that the United States is capable of promoting or altering a predicted outcome. I will argue here that these two assumptions are largely the result of an unrecognized, deeply ingrained, and enduring cognitive bias that results in the misapplication of a linear behavioral template to China, which, like all nation-states, in reality behaves "nonlinearly." 2 In making my case, I will explain how cognitive bias fosters this misapplication, discuss the illusions of certainty-especially of predictability and influencethat this misapplication promotes, and examine the complementary non-linear perspectives that might correct the imbalance. Finally, I will suggest how such nonlinear perspectives might be cultivated and applied to-in the words of Sherman Kent-"elevate the level of debate." 3 1 "Cognitive biases are mental errors caused by our simplified information processing strategies. It is important to distinguish cognitive biases from other forms of bias, such as cultural bias, organizational bias, or bias that results from one's own self-interest. In other words, a cognitive bias does not result from any emotional or intellectual predisposition toward a certain judgment, but rather from subconscious mental procedures for processing information." From Richards J.Heuer, Psychology of Intelligence Analysis (Washington, DC: Central Intelligence Agency, 1999), 111-12. 2 This largely unconscious application of a simplifying behavioral template is an excellent example of "bounded" or limited rationality, a concept first advanced by Herbert Simon. "Because of limits in human mental capacity . . . the mind cannot cope directly with the complexity of the world. Rather, we construct a simplified mental model of reality and then work with this model. We behave rationally within the confines of our mental model, but this model is not always well adapted to the requirements of the real world." Cited in Heuer, 3. 3 Martin Petersen, "The Challenge for the Political Analyst," Studies in Intelligence 47, no. 1 (2003 The term "linear," when applied to a system-any group of components that together interact to form a larger whole-describes behavior of the whole which is additive, that is to say equal to the sum of its parts. 4 By extension, a linear approach to understanding a system holds that once the behavior of a system's component pieces are understood individually, one needs only to add them up to understand and predict the system's behavior as a whole. This analytical methodology (from the Greek analyein meaning "to break up"), often termed "reductionism," "linear reductionism" or "Newtonian reductionism" is, by and large, the default Westernand certainly Americanapproach to information processing. 5 The main limitation of this approach, as the term reductionism suggests, is that it only works consistently with systems that are genuinely reducible. 4 What this article refers to as a "nonlinear" system is more commonly, and perhaps more accurately, referred to as a "complex" system. "Nonlinear" is more often used than "complex" because most people confuse the scientific distinction between the term complex (i.e., as it is used here to mean "having many interactions that can lead to untold changes in behavior") and its more common usage (i.e., having many components Development of such a "synthetic" perspective is usually more easily said than done. Since synthesis is the antithesis of analysis and most Americans lack a well-developed nonlinear/synthetic intuition, the intuitive response when confronted with significant complexity (numerous components, interactions, and feedback loops) is to default to the artificial but comforting simplicity and manageability (read predictability and malleability) of linear reductionism. It is this applica- 
Unrealistic Expectations
In addition to additivity, linear systems also have identifiable cause-and-effect relationships, repeatability and proportionality between inputs and outputs-the properties that make linear systems susceptible to prediction and manipulation, the hallmarks of America's China debate. 10 In the recent argument, predictions of China's future have tended to fall on a broad spectrum bounded by extremes that might best be 9 This reductionist mind-set is clearly illustrated in the terms with which foreign policy tends to be discussed. For instance, one often hears of foreign policy analysis or intelligence analysts but rarely, if ever, of foreign policy synthesis or intelligence synthesists. Moreover, when synthesis is mentioned, it is usually thought of as organizing and summarizing information and not as a distinct intellectual approach or perspective. 10 Thomas J.Czerwinski, Coping with the Bounds: Speculations on Nonlinearity in Military Affairs (Washington, DC: National Defense University), 8-9. characterized as "rising China" and "doomed China." 11 If one can get beyond the ominous images those characterizations evoke, what really needs to be seen is the severe contrast and enormous uncertainty they represent. Given this evident uncertainty, how is it that individual predictors feel confident enough to make firm, single-outcome predictions-with all the certainty implicit in them? A clue is to be found in the prevalence of one (little thought about) linear term/concept: trajectory.
The Newtonian term "trajectory" almost invariably accompanies American discussion of futures; it is typically a manifestation of the misapplication of a linear, behavioral template. Formally defined, the term describes smooth, evolutionary, continuous-and predictable-movement over time, such as those of the planets in accordance with Newton's laws of motion. By contrast, the term does not apply to the abrupt, revolutionary, or discontinuous perturbations that inevitably-but unpredictablyoccur in nonlinear systems. In other words, the use of the word "trajectory" is really just another 11 In the popular literature, these extremes have probably been best captured (if only by the juxtaposition of their titles) by The Coming Conflict with China (Richard Bernstein Ross Munro, Knopf, 1997), which posits an increasingly powerful China on track to challenge US primacy, and The Coming Collapse of China (Gordon Chang, Random House, 2001) , which argues that China's many internal difficulties will soon plunge it into another of its periodic internal paroxysms. trajectories in the first place-as the following examples will show-one also needs to recognize that it is the much more apparent non-cognitive biasesideological, cultural, religious, organizational, self-interest, among others-that largely incline predictors to their predictions. For one thing, noncognitive biases tend to determine which trends, factors, or dynamics a prognosticator will select for extrapolation. Moreover, non-cognitive biases also tend to shape the linear causeand-effect chains predictors will envision. Take the following "rising China" prediction: This characterization of the socalled "conventional wisdom" isolates and extrapolates the economic trends-rapid economic growth rates-that support the projection. Moreover, the projected trajectory clearly is connected to the noncognitive bias that anticipates a cause-and-effect between continued economic growth and world power and rivalry with the United States.
Had the non-cognitive biases of those holding the "common wisdom" in this instance been different-say, inclined to the "doomed China" scenario-the trajectory they would have projected would certainly have been quite different as well. A predictor with a more pessimistic view of China's future might have focused on (i.e., isolated and extrapolated) a completely different set of readily available economic trends (rising unemployment, teetering banks, endemic corruption, etc.). Moreover, such a predictor would probably have been inclined to anticipate a very different causeand-effect dynamic, even if he had started from the same isolated trend as the "rising China" forecaster. For example, the cause-and-effect chain of the "doomed China" predictor might envision the continuation of rapid economic growth leading to unfulfilled high expectations and social and political unrest, internal turmoil, and conceivably, collapse. To sum up this predictive process, linear cognitive bias explains how single-outcome predictions are made and non-cognitive biases largely determine what predictions are made.
Illusions of Influence
Lest one believe that excessive reliance on linear perspectives leads only to illusory single-outcome predictions, it is important to recognize that linear bias also fuels the illusion that the United States can effectively influence (promote or prevent) projected outcomes. 14 US policies aimed at shaping outcomes have long been framed and debated in the largely linear and mechanistic terms of linkages, levers, inertia, momentum, tension, etc. In this context, China tends to be discussed as if it were a physical object that can be pressured, pushed, pulled, or propelled. Examples were painfully (to me) plentiful in the debate over the extension of Normal Trade Relations (NTR) to China. Those favoring the extension argued that NTR and the economic engagement it presumably promotes would inevitably leverage China to make desirable (from the US perspective) economic, political, and social reforms. Those opposed argued that denial of NTR would be an equally, or even more, effective lever for desired change in 14 Simultaneously believing in predicted continuity and the ability to decisively influence or change China's course requires a significant degree of "cognitive dissonance." It is another indicator of linear bias.
China. As contrasting as these arguments were, they had in common the fundamental belief that NTR gave the United States an effective and predictable "lever" with which to achieve a specific outcome in China. ing for proportionality and identifiable cause-and-effect), when erroneously applied to a nonlinear system, provides the illusion of calibrated influence. Economies, like the nation-states and international system to which they are intertwined, are nonlinear and notoriously resistant to precise manipulation (never mind prediction). Despite this fact, however, the public continues to expect, and policymakers continue to claim (at least at opportune moments), that such precise manipulation is possible. Why this disconnect? Well, the answer, not surprisingly, is that when looked at through a linear prism, the economy takes on a mechanical character that permits it to be discussed-however artificiallyas though it were a ball of clay that can be mechanically manipulated, physically propelled, or mathematically predicted á la Newton's laws of motion. 16 Linear processes have their own logic and can make sense, but they really only give those who look at systems in such ways arguments for a single possible scenario-not the much wider array of plausible outcomes or effects that exist in complex sys- tems. Thus, in the broader sense, these approaches fail to achieve Gell-Mann's "look at the whole" and in doing so wash out complex dynamism, with its alternative outcomes, doubleedged swords, and unexpected effects that are inherent in the behavior of nonlinear systems.
A Complementary Nonlinear Perspective
If the debates such as the one taking place over China are ever to reasonably reflect reality, they must first incorporate the nonlinear complements of the linear characteristics on which such debates have tended to focus. In other words, analysts, policymakers, and commentators must appreciate the distinct behavioral characteristics of nonlinear systems as well as their analytical and policymaking implications. Below are nonlinear complements and their implications, illustrated using the Chinese experience:
Nonlinear systems are synergistic, not additive; the big picture must be kept in mind and urges to simplify controlled. First and foremost, a complex system's essence lies in interaction of its parts, not in any individual component. These interactions may be direct or indirect, obvious or subtle. From both analytical and policymaking perspectives, this characteristic makes for a daunting and often messy challenges in that it requires a highly interdisciplinary perspective. Here, the NTR debate again is instructive in that it attempted to separate economic issues from security and human rights issues. There were reasons for attempting this socalled "de-linkage"-including simplification, manageability, and outright political expediency-but any such separation was unavoidably artificial.
Nonlinear systems have uncertain cause-and-effect relationships; side effects and unintended consequences must be considered inevitable. The wide interconnectivity and interaction of most complex systems makes cause-and-effect relationships ever changing and often uncertain. With respect to China's entry into WTO, for example, no one can be certain of the precise social, political, and economic effects, even though contradictory prognostications are confidently bandied about. These include the judgment that the effects of WTO will be wrenching, causing rising unemployment and demands for political change, on the one hand, and the assertion that WTO will lead to exactly the opposite: extension of the political status quo because WTO-spurred economic growth will give the current regime greater legitimacy. Both of these judgments, often made with inordinate certainty, rely on dubious linear calculations that imply precision where none exists.
The behavior of nonlinear systems cannot be repeated; arguments by analogy will never apply precisely. 
"
Metaphors both reflect and reinforce the mind-set from which they spring-no matter how unrealistic that " mind-set may be.
necessarily do the same in China is equally debatable. 18
Movements in nonlinear systems are the result of disproportionate inputs and outputs; ripeness (timing), reinforcement, and resistance must all be weighed. In order for any impulse, especially one introduced from outside, to prosper and ultimately reveal and/or sustain its effect on a complex system's behavior ("tipping" is the usual mechanical term applied to this), it must be reinforced by the system itself. Without positive feedback on some level, an impulse will not survive, much less flourish or emerge in the face of systemic resistance (negative feedback). Sometimes this process takes a long time. For example, Taiwan needed nearly four decades from the arrival in 1949 of Chiang Kai-shek and his Chinese Nationalists to experience a sustainable and systematic political reordering. Similarly, punitive sanctions in place for more than 50 years have not led to such a reordering in Cuba or North Korea. The confluence of circumstances and timing cannot be emphasized enough: no matter how carefully crafted or brilliant a policy might be, the moment and the conditions must be opportune-ripe-if the desired effect or outcome is to result. 19
Changing the Metaphor, Methodology, and mind-set Evolution, adaptation, side effects, interactions, ripeness, etc.: these are the terms and concepts of biologists, psychologists, and medical doctors, and the metaphors of the life sciences must replace the mechanical metaphor of the mechanical and physical sciences if nonlinear systems are to be better understood and better debated. For foreign policy practitioners, this means learning to think, converse, and act more like the professionals in the life sciences. For instance, just as doctors need to think about interactions (drug combinations), side-effects (allergic reactions), particularity (patient specifics: age, weight, blood type, etc.), and timing (stages of a particular illness, age of patient, etc.), analysts must think similarly. Correspondingly, policymakers need to formulate and prescribe policies that, like effective medical treatments, demonstrate balance (both curative and preventative elements), flexibility (adjustable), and nuance (subtlety), and both must 19 "Ripeness" in a foreign policy/strategic context receives exceptional treatment in: Steven R. Mann, "Chaos Theory and Strategic Thought," Parameters, Autumn, 1992: 54-68. abandon the prevailing mechanical lexicon (trajectories, leverage, inertia, momentum, tension, tipping, delinking, etc.).
Selection of new metaphors is bound to be controversial as many who read this will undoubtedly be inclined to dismiss this discussion as much ado over figures-of-speech or semantics. After all, mechanical terms and concepts seem inextricably infused in the foreign policy lexicon. Failure to try, however, would be a mistake. Metaphors both reflect and reinforce the mind-set from which they spring-no matter how unrealistic that mind-set may be-and realistic policy cannot be expected to emerge from unrealistic discourse. 20
I will concede that changing metaphors and mind-sets will take time-the US national security establishment is, after all, a complex system and the time may not be ripe for a radical change in customs and language. For the near-term, more immediately applicable approaches will need to be found. Culturally embrace uncertainty.
Thematically: Emphasize the understanding of possibilities, not prediction.
Methodologically: Make alternative scenarios/futures a "mainstream," not an "alternative," approach to tradecraft. Emphasize the explication of the assumptions, key variables, and signposts for each scenario.
Editorially: Resist the temptation to try to wash out analytical uncertainty by eliminating caveats.
Managerially: Do not necessarily pressure analysts to "make a call" in the face of significant uncertainty.
Metaphorically:
Recognize that language both reflects and reinforces bias/mind-set, and consequently, consciously adopt more nonlinear terminology and metaphors. (A good symbolic starting point for CIA might be modification of the Kent School's name to read: The Sherman Kent School for Intelligence Analysis and Synthesis.)
Training: Require all analysts, managers, and editors to take a course in linear/nonlinear thinking and dynamics. Such a course should be developed and taught by the Kent School.
Increase computer modeling, visualization, and simulation.
Make a concerted and serious effort to pursue the development of agentbased modeling (ABM), visualization, simulation, and other advanced computer tools/techniques for exploring and explaining the dynamics of highly complex/nonlinear systems.
scenario/outcome/future methodology, with its illumination of key uncertainties and potential discontinuities, is an approach that acknowledges complexity/ nonlinearity and identifies warning issues and policy opportunities-things policymakers expect from useful analysis. Of course, there will always be policymakers who resist this approach on the grounds that the provision of alternative scenarios simply muddies the water and reveals hesitancy on the part of analysts to take risks or make calls. While Tuchman probably did not think of herself as a nonlinearist, this passage is brimming with nonlinearity: positive feedback/reinforcement, ripeness, uncertain cause-and-effect, and incompatibility with physical/mechanical manipulation. And just as this nonlinear perspective helped bring a dose of warming realism to a debate that had been largely frozen for some two decades, one hopes that it might also serve as an example of 24 Barbara Tuchman, Stilwell and the American Experience in China, 1911 -1945 (New York: Macmillan, 1971 , 531.
the much-needed realism that similarly nonlinear perspectives might inject into the contemporary debate as well.
Conclusion: Stop Trying to Think Straight
To end then, it is not unfair to expect the cultivation of nonlinear perspectives to help alleviate the excessive certainty that linear bias has infused into the debate. And while that alone would be an extraordinary accomplishment, it is nonetheless important that I not oversell the potential contributions of such perspectives. At the end of the day, nonlinear perspectives are, quite simply, not going to change the fact that the subjects of such thinking will remain inherently unpredictable and resistant to precise manipulation. Moreover, linear perspectives will remain necessary tools for simplifying and managing our understanding of complex issues, provided their imperfections and artificialities are acknowledged.
In the final analysis (or hopefully, synthesis), perhaps the most that can be hoped from nonlinear perspectives is a more "blurred" (to borrow Spence's term), and greater, understanding of the many patterns, possibilities, and scenarios that China's future may present, as well as the limits of US ability to influence China's course. Put another way, when it comes to thinking about China (or any complex foreign policy challenge for that matter), it is important not to always think straight.
